When finance ministers and central bankers meet at the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings in Bangkok next week, they will find that the technology to move tokenized assets across borders is ready. The rules are not.
Many of today’s institutions and global standards architecture were built in response to a crisis provoked by gaps in supervisory alignment. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was established in 1974, following turmoil in international banking, in the aftermath of the collapse of Herstatt Bank. When German regulators shut down Herstatt Bank, counterparty banks that paid Deutschemarks in Germany that morning did not receive their dollars in the US later that day. This settlement failure exposed the risk of cross-currency transactions not clearing simultaneously.
While Herstatt was the most famous collapse, the 1970s saw widespread financial crises amidst the rapid expansion of international banking through the Eurodollar market, offshore finance and technological advances. No one had defined which supervisor, home or host, was responsible for what. Markets were left without consolidated oversight, common prudential standards, nor formal channels for sharing information.
The lesson was not that international markets required identical national regulation. It was that interconnected markets need supervisory cooperation and common standards to manage risks that do not stop at national borders.
Fragmentation in today’s tokenized markets
Fast forward to today and there is a similar challenge in tokenized markets.
Tokenization’s strongest value proposition is to upgrade how value moves. This is true both within an economy and across economies. Yet it requires a guarantee of similar outcomes and protections to investors wherever the asset sits. It requires regulatory interoperability.
That is hard. In a global market where technology, talent and capital are borderless, jurisdictions need to differentiate themselves. Regimes which not only allow but proactively encourage innovative companies to test new products in their market, give them an edge. This ‘competitiveness dividend’ is real, and industry has played a role in encouraging jurisdictions to tap into it by framing digital asset regulation as a race of winners and losers. Some regulatory competition encourages innovation. However, a global market in which the same tokenized asset encounters materially different legal, prudential, and conduct treatment every time it crosses a border is much harder to scale.
Consider stablecoins, which face different regulatory frameworks in the United States and the European Union. The same dollar stablecoin faces very different reserve, redemption and licensing requirements depending on which side of the Atlantic it is held. This divergence matters more as these markets grow. A run on a global stablecoin would expose differences in how, when, and through whom – and even which – coin holders can redeem.
The failure of an issuer licensed in multiple jurisdictions could raise the same question regulators faced in the 1970s, namely which authority intervenes first, and how the others cooperate on risks outside their own jurisdiction. Significant differences between regimes also push activity towards the least restrictive jurisdiction, even where the risks extend far beyond it.
There is much talk of regulatory interoperability, but the reality on the ground is that cooperation continues on an issue-by-issue basis, though consensus on the direction of travel has been lost. There is not even a shared classification of tokenized assets that authorities can rely on. Within the EU, regulators are still debating whether a real-world asset issued on a distributed ledger needs a bespoke framework at all. The result is a patchwork of how tokenized assets can be issued, held, transferred, and settled.
For tokenized markets, this divergence is becoming increasingly difficult. While the technology to move assets across borders exists, the regulatory frameworks that allow those assets to move seamlessly between jurisdictions do not.
The Obstacle is Political
The obstacle is increasingly political, not technical. Markets have strong reasons to want greater interoperability, while governments have strong incentives to preserve regulatory autonomy and capture the competitiveness dividend that divergence brings.
Two roadblocks must be removed for convergence to happen. The first is accepting that short-term national advantages derived from regulatory fragmentation will, in the longer term, be outweighed by the commensurate fragmentation of the market. The second is cultivating collaboration in an environment where there is growing resistance to interdependency.
Neither roadblock requires countries to adopt identical national rulebooks. Jurisdictions can and should differ in their institutional structures, licensing processes and supervisory models, and in rules that reflect their domestic markets and policy objectives. That leaves ample room to compete. Divergence becomes problematic where it changes the basic rights, risks, or regulatory treatment attached to the same cross-border activity. At a minimum, jurisdictions need consistent outcomes on asset classification, prudential safeguards, settlement, and market integrity. Holders should know that moving an asset across borders does not change what it is, the rights and protections attached to it, or who is responsible when something goes wrong.
Cross-border markets are enabled not only by regulatory harmonization and supervisory cooperation, but also by shared infrastructure that allows participants in different jurisdictions to transact with trust and confidence. Common payment, messaging, and settlement infrastructure has developed alongside international regulatory frameworks, providing the technical foundations through which otherwise distinct national financial systems can interact. Tokenized markets will require the same combination of regulatory and infrastructural interoperability. While a competitively advantageous regulatory framework may encourage that initial wave of national development, ultimately, it will never fulfill the true promise of tokenized markets which are global.
Protecting national competitive advantages and retaining control over critical financial infrastructure are legitimate policy objectives. Pursued independently, however, they risk producing a tokenized market that is global in its technology and liquidity, but fragmented by regulations.
Orchestrating Cooperation and The Role of Multilateral Institutions
The Financial Stability Board (FSB), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) have already laid a solid foundation, with common, principles-based approaches to tokenized assets and tokenized money. However, principles are only the starting point. Translating these principles into national frameworks that allow tokenized assets to be transacted across borders, and when their issuers are located in other jurisdictions, is the next challenge.
Multilateral institutions are well positioned to articulate the risks of continued fragmentation and to advocate for cooperation that is aligned with today’s geopolitical realities. They can take two concrete steps: 1) provide forums for regulators and market participants to identify the areas where greater interoperability is necessary for cross-border tokenized markets to function; and 2) a platform to develop a shared taxonomy for tokenized assets, so the same instrument is recognized as the same thing across borders; clear home and host responsibilities for cross-border issuers. National frameworks will continue to differ. These steps would prevent the differences from becoming gaps.
Progress has been made in relation to different use cases to address important foundational gaps. For instance, Project Agorá, led by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) with seven central banks and more than 40 financial firms, has offered a practical blueprint for technical and legal harmonization, where a shared ledger provides a workflow orchestration layer that never requires central banks to cede control or access to their ledgers. This demonstrates that greater interoperability does not necessarily require the surrender of national regulatory or monetary sovereignty.
Markets are already asking for the regulatory interoperability that tokenization needs to scale. Policymakers should want it too: not only because fragmentation will constrain the development of the market, but because greater cross-border activity without corresponding regulatory and supervisory cooperation creates risks of its own. The IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings in Bangkok offer an opportunity to spur progress. The task now is to build international cooperation around tokenized markets at the same time as we build the markets themselves.
If there’s anything to learn from history, it’s this: in 1974, cooperation came after the crisis. In 2026, we have a chance to cooperate before one hits.
Featured Authors:
Nilmini Rubin is Chief Policy Officer at Hedera, where she leads the Global Policy team and serves on the Board’s Risk Committee.
Isadora Arredondo is Vice President of Global Policy at Hedera, where she leads engagement with central banks, policymakers, and financial institutions.
All views expressed by members are their own and not reflective of the views of the Bretton Woods Committee or the views of their employers.


